US and Taiwan sign trade agreement to seal chip investment

Date: Feb 13, 2026
Source: Financial Times

中文摘要（约1000字）

美国与台湾正式签署新的贸易协议，核心是把双边关税与产业投资绑定在一起：美国将把针对台湾的关税下调至15%，台湾则承诺以大规模采购与投资回流美国作为交换条件。与此前单纯围绕“贸易逆差”或“短期选举口号”的关税博弈不同，这份协议将半导体供应链安全、制造业回流和能源采购三条线打包推进，显示华盛顿的政策目标正在从“惩罚性加税”转向“结构性重塑”。从政治叙事上看，这也是特朗普团队将“高关税压力”与“定向豁免+投资承诺”结合的一次样板操作。

从条款细节看，协议有明显的“交换式设计”。美国方面，除下调台湾关税外，还承诺对部分美国短缺或成本敏感产品给予关税豁免，包括仿制药、航天零部件以及美国本土难以替代的自然资源；对台湾部分进口（如水果、香料、咖啡）取消“对等关税”，并延续对若干农产品的豁免逻辑，以压低美国国内食品价格压力。台湾方面则给出三年期大额采购清单：约444亿美元液化天然气和原油、约152亿美元民航飞机及发动机、约252亿美元电力设备采购。换言之，这不是单一关税文件，而是一份涵盖贸易、能源、航空与电力设备的跨领域产业协定。

对半导体产业而言，最关键的并非关税数字本身，而是“投资与供应链韧性”的政策锚定。美国希望通过关税调整与投资承诺，把台湾在芯片产业链中的资本、产能与技术协同更深地嵌入美国本土制造体系，从而降低单点地缘风险。美方官员也明确将协议意义定义为提升高科技供应链韧性，并扩大美国出口机会。对台湾来说，这份协议一方面消除了相较日、韩的不利关税差，避免在美国市场出现相对劣势；另一方面，也意味着其对美经贸关系将更加制度化、长期化，代价是要承担更高的采购承诺与更紧密的产业政策协调。

从区域经贸竞争看，该协议可被视为美国在亚太重构产业联盟的一环：对关键伙伴实施“有条件降税”，并将市场准入与资本承诺挂钩，形成区别于传统自贸协定的“地缘产业协定”模式。其外溢效应可能体现在三方面：第一，其他经济体会加快与美国谈判“等效条件”，避免在关税与产业补贴体系中落后；第二，能源、航空和电力设备等受益行业可能提前体现订单预期；第三，芯片相关投资与制造布局将继续向“安全优先、效率次优”的方向调整，全球分工效率可能下降，但供应安全溢价上升。

短期市场层面，这份协议有助于稳定“关税升级—供应链再冲击”的担忧，对美国制造业投资叙事和台湾出口预期形成支撑；但中期仍存在执行与政治风险：若美国国内通胀压力再起、选举周期政策反复，或地缘摩擦升级，协议中的豁免与采购节奏都可能被重新谈判。此外，大额采购承诺能否按期落地，还取决于能源价格、航空交付能力以及企业资本开支周期。总体而言，这份协议释放的是“以关税为杠杆、以投资为落点、以供应链安全为目标”的新信号，其重要性不在于单日市场波动，而在于它可能成为未来美方处理关键产业贸易关系的模板。

English Summary (~1000 words)

The United States and Taiwan have formally signed a new trade agreement that links tariff relief with long-term industrial commitments, particularly in semiconductors and related strategic sectors. At the headline level, Washington will reduce tariffs on Taiwanese goods to 15 per cent, while Taiwan commits to a substantial package of investment and purchases tied to US industrial priorities. The Financial Times report frames this as part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to secure semiconductor supply chains, attract manufacturing capital into the United States, and rebalance trade terms with key partners through negotiated, sector-specific deals rather than purely punitive tariff escalation.

The structure of the agreement is notable because it goes beyond a conventional tariff adjustment. Instead of simply reducing or increasing duties across categories, both sides exchanged market-access concessions for targeted commitments in energy, aviation, and industrial equipment. On the US side, the agreement includes tariff waivers on selected products where domestic supply constraints are meaningful, such as generic drugs, aerospace parts, and natural resources not readily available in the US. It also removes reciprocal tariffs on certain Taiwanese imports, including fruits, spices, and coffee. This design appears consistent with a political goal that is often underappreciated in tariff negotiations: to reduce domestic consumer price pressure while still preserving leverage in strategic sectors.

On the Taiwanese side, the commitments are large and highly specific. According to the agreement text referenced by FT, Taiwan has agreed to spend approximately $44.4 billion on liquefied natural gas and crude oil, $15.2 billion on civil aircraft and engines, and $25.2 billion on power equipment over the next three years. Taiwan will also reduce tariffs on a broad range of US goods, including autos and auto parts, chemicals, seafood, machinery, health-related products, electrical goods, metals, minerals, and multiple agricultural products. Taken together, these terms suggest that the agreement is intended to create visible, measurable flows of demand toward US exporters while embedding Taiwan more deeply in an American-centered industrial and energy framework.

From Washington’s perspective, the strategic objective is clear: resilience. US trade officials explicitly presented the deal as a way to strengthen supply-chain security in high-technology sectors. In policy terms, this reflects a shift from “tariffs as punishment” toward “tariffs as bargaining architecture.” Rather than imposing broad, static duties, the US is using differential tariffs and selective exemptions to shape behavior by partners that are central to US industrial strategy. The Taiwan deal also aligns Taiwan’s tariff treatment with that of Japan and South Korea, reducing distortions across key US allies in East Asia and reinforcing the idea of a coordinated regional economic-security bloc.

For Taiwan, the agreement appears to be both a defensive and offensive move. Defensively, it removes a bilateral disadvantage that could have emerged if Taiwan had remained under a less favorable tariff regime than peer economies. Offensively, it offers Taiwan a clearer policy channel into US industrial expansion, especially in semiconductors and power infrastructure, where long-cycle investment decisions depend heavily on regulatory predictability. However, this comes with real obligations: large procurement promises, tariff cuts on US imports, and potentially tighter policy synchronization with Washington over time. In other words, Taiwan gains parity and strategic access, but at the cost of greater integration into US-led supply-chain politics.

The agreement also has implications for how global trade policy may evolve in the next few years. Traditional free-trade agreements are often broad, slow, and legalistic. This deal looks more like a “geoeconomic compact”: fast-moving, politically branded, and operationally tied to critical industries. If this model proves durable, other countries may seek similar arrangements to avoid losing relative competitiveness in the US market. That could generate a wave of mini-deals organized around sectoral priorities—chips, energy, aviation, critical minerals—rather than comprehensive tariff harmonization. Such a trend might improve strategic resilience for participating states but could also reduce global efficiency by fragmenting markets into preference-based blocs.

In market terms, the immediate effect is likely to be interpreted as modestly supportive for sectors linked to the procurement basket: US energy exporters, aerospace manufacturers, and selected industrial equipment suppliers. It may also stabilize sentiment around US-Taiwan economic ties in a period where geopolitical uncertainty remains elevated. For Taiwan-related assets, the signal is that policy risk on tariff treatment has narrowed, though execution risk remains. Markets will watch whether the promised purchases are implemented on schedule and whether the semiconductor investment component translates into concrete project timelines, capacity additions, and cross-border technology partnerships.

There are, however, meaningful risks to the agreement’s medium-term credibility. First, domestic US inflation dynamics could re-politicize tariff policy. If consumer prices rise sharply, exemptions could expand; if political rhetoric hardens, exemptions could be revisited. Second, election-cycle volatility in Washington may alter negotiating behavior and enforcement priorities. Third, delivery constraints could complicate procurement commitments: LNG availability, aircraft production bottlenecks, and power-equipment lead times are all subject to cyclical and logistical shocks. Finally, broader geopolitical tensions—especially in the US-China-Taiwan triangle—could reshape the policy environment faster than contractual language can adapt.

A deeper reading of the FT report suggests that this agreement is less about one bilateral tariff number and more about institutional signaling. It indicates that the US intends to operationalize industrial strategy through trade instruments and that Taiwan is willing to pay for tariff certainty with long-horizon purchasing and investment alignment. In practical terms, this may become a repeatable template for future US negotiations with strategically important partners: calibrated tariff relief, targeted exemptions for inflation-sensitive goods, and binding procurement or investment undertakings in sectors deemed nationally significant.

Overall, the US-Taiwan trade agreement marks a consequential step in the merger of trade policy and industrial security policy. It reduces immediate bilateral friction, advances supply-chain resilience objectives, and provides a framework for measurable economic cooperation across chips, energy, aviation, and infrastructure equipment. But its ultimate significance will depend on implementation discipline and political durability. If executed consistently, it could reinforce a new model of strategic trade governance. If disrupted by domestic politics or external shocks, it may instead become another example of how difficult it is to convert geoeconomic intent into sustained, verifiable outcomes.

Key Vocabulary (重点词汇详解)

1) Resilience

– Pronunciation: /rɪˈzɪliəns/
– Definition: The ability to recover quickly from difficulties; robustness under stress.（韧性，抗冲击恢复能力）
– Contextual Meaning: In this article, it refers to the ability of US high-tech supply chains to keep functioning despite geopolitical or market disruptions.
– Usage:
– Part of Speech: Noun; adjective form: resilient.
– Common Collocations: supply-chain resilience; economic resilience; resilient infrastructure.
– Warning: Do not confuse with “resistance” (抵抗) only; resilience includes recovery and adaptation.
– Example Sentences:
– From article: “…significantly enhance the resilience of our supply chains…”
– New: “Building dual sourcing in chip packaging improves operational resilience during geopolitical shocks.”
（在芯片封装环节建立双供应来源，可在地缘冲击中提升运营韧性。）

2) Reciprocal tariffs

– Pronunciation: /rɪˈsɪprəkəl ˈtærɪfs/
– Definition: Tariffs imposed in response to another country’s tariffs, often framed as equivalent countermeasures.（对等关税）
– Contextual Meaning: The US agreed to remove some reciprocal tariffs on selected Taiwanese imports.
– Usage:
– Part of Speech: Noun phrase.
– Common Collocations: impose reciprocal tariffs; lift reciprocal tariffs; reciprocal tariff regime.
– Warning: “Reciprocal” implies mirrored policy response, not necessarily equal welfare impact.
– Example Sentences:
– From article: “…the US will remove the ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on some imports from Taiwan…”
– New: “Reciprocal tariffs may look symmetric on paper but can hit consumers asymmetrically.”
（对等关税在纸面上看对称，但对消费者的冲击往往并不对称。）

3) Waive

– Pronunciation: /weɪv/
– Definition: To officially refrain from enforcing a rule, right, or fee.（豁免，免除）
– Contextual Meaning: Washington promised to waive tariffs on certain categories such as generic drugs and aerospace parts.
– Usage:
– Part of Speech: Verb; noun form: waiver.
– Common Collocations: waive tariffs; waive requirements; tariff waiver.
– Warning: “Waive” is voluntary policy relief; different from “abolish” (彻底废除制度)。
– Example Sentences:
– From article: “…comes with a US promise to waive tariffs on generic drugs…”
– New: “The regulator agreed to waive filing fees for critical medical imports.”
（监管机构同意对关键医疗进口免除申报费用。）

4) Seal (a deal/agreement)

– Pronunciation: /siːl/
– Definition: To finalize or conclude something formally.（敲定、最终达成）
– Contextual Meaning: The headline uses “seal chip investment” to show the agreement formally locks in investment commitments.
– Usage:
– Part of Speech: Verb.
– Common Collocations: seal a deal; seal an agreement; seal the partnership.
– Warning: In business news, “seal” is figurative (not physical sealing).
– Example Sentences:
– From article: “US and Taiwan sign trade agreement to seal chip investment.”
– New: “Both sides worked overnight to seal the agreement before markets opened.”
（双方连夜磋商，在市场开盘前敲定协议。）

5) Non-tariff barriers

– Pronunciation: /nɒn ˈtærɪf ˈbæriərz/
– Definition: Trade restrictions other than tariffs, such as quotas, technical standards, licensing rules, and customs procedures.（非关税壁垒）
– Contextual Meaning: US officials said the deal would also reduce barriers beyond tariffs to expand export opportunities.
– Usage:
– Part of Speech: Noun phrase.
– Common Collocations: eliminate non-tariff barriers; regulatory barriers; standards-related barriers.
– Warning: Non-tariff barriers are often embedded in regulation and harder to remove than tariff cuts.
– Example Sentences:
– From article: “…eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers facing US exports to Taiwan…”
– New: “Even after tariff cuts, non-tariff barriers can still constrain market access.”
（即使关税下调，非关税壁垒仍可能限制市场准入。）